Barnes v. Felix, 145 S. Ct. 1353 (2025): Use of Force - How Does It Impact K9

Facts

  • The case involves Ashtian Barnes, who was pulled over by Officer Roberto Felix Jr. in 2016 for unpaid tolls using a rental car. Barnes was unaware of the tolls.  

  • During the stop, police claimed to smell marijuana and asked Barnes for a license/insurance. Barnes couldn’t produce them immediately and indicated they might be in the trunk.  

  • Barnes began to drive away. Defendant Felix stepped onto the doorsill of Barnes’s car as it moved, ordered him not to move, and then fired two shots inside the vehicle. Barnes was fatally wounded. About two seconds elapsed between when Felix stepped onto the car and when he fired his first shot; about five seconds between when the vehicle began to move and when it was finally stopped.  

Procedural History

  • Barnes’s mother filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the shooting was an excessive force violation of the Fourth Amendment.  

  • The District Court granted summary judgment for Felix, relying on the Fifth Circuit’s “moment-of-threat” rule, which essentially limits the inquiry into excessive force to the very instant in which the officer perceived a threat (I.e., when Felix was clinging to the moving car).  

  • The Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision, applying the moment-of-threat doctrine.  

Supreme Court’s Decision

  • On May 15, 2025, the Supreme Court unanimously (9-0) vacated the Fifth Circuit decision and remanded the case.  

  • The Court held that the moment-of-threat rule is incompatible with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The Fourth Amendment requires a “totality of the circumstances” approach when evaluating excessive force claims—that is, courts must consider all relevant facts and events leading up to the moment of force, not just the split second when threat is perceived.  

Key Legal Holdings / Principles

  • Force must be judged as objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, considering all known circumstances. This reaffirms and applies principles from Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner.  

  • The Court explicitly rejected a rule that limits analysis to only what is happening at the exact moment of threat (often a very narrow window)—because that artificially excludes important context.  

Significance / What It Changes

  • Circuit Split Resolved: Several circuits had applied the moment-of-threat doctrine (especially the Fifth), which gave officers broad protection in deadly force cases by ignoring what led up to the moment. Barnes invalidated that doctrine.  

  • More Context Matters: Courts now must consider pre-shooting conduct, warnings, the officer’s perception, what the suspect was doing, whether alternatives existed—things that earlier were often trimmed out under the moment-rule.  

  • May Help Plaintiffs in § 1983 Excessive Force Cases: Because more facts are now admissible, plaintiffs have a better shot at showing that force was not reasonable under the full context.  

  • Effect on Qualified Immunity / Summary Judgment: Courts granting summary judgment or dismissing claims might need to reexamine whether they properly considered the full timeline of events. Under Barnes, trimming away context (the “moment-of-threat” only) may be an error.  

Limitations / What It Did  Not Decide

  • The Court did not decide how or precisely which parts of the timeline are always relevant—it did not lay out a fixed test of time windows. It left it to the lower courts to apply totality in each fact-intensive case.  

  • It did not resolve the issue of officer-created jeopardy (I.e., situations where an officer’s earlier conduct contributes to the danger later). The Court noted that it was not decided in this case.  

Why Barnes v. Felix Matters

This case represents a significant development in the use-of-force law. It clarifies that courts cannot cut off unnecessary parts of the timeline just because the threat is immediate. Here are some takeaways for law enforcement, policy makers, attorneys, and courts:

  • Agencies will likely need to train officers that justification for force depends not only on what occurs in the seconds before the shooting, but on all actions that led up to it (e.g., did the officer escalate unnecessarily, did the suspect have opportunity to comply, etc.).

  • When drafting policies / use-of-force forms, departments may need to ensure that all relevant facts can be included, not just what happens at the “moment of threat.”

  • In litigation, both sides will scrutinize the officer’s pre-force conduct more heavily. Defense arguments that rely on moment-of-threat only will be less viable.

  • Courts must be careful at summary judgment and after to ensure claims aren’t dismissed prematurely by ignoring too much context.

How Barnes v. Felix may apply in K9 use‐of‐force cases

K9 deployments often involve use of force claims (bite, pursue, hold, etc.), sometimes even deadly force (if the dog severely injures someone or causes death, or if the situation escalates). Before Barnes, in some jurisdictions, the “moment of threat” framework might have led courts to consider only the instant when a K9 handler gave the command or when the dog bit, rather than examining what led up to that moment. Barnes shifts that.

Here are ways Barnes is likely to be used/is already being used in K9 cases:

  1. Broader context in evaluating whether the K9 deployment was reasonable:

    Under Barnes, courts will more fully examine what happened before the bite or other K9 force, including training, warnings given, whether the subject was resisting, whether the handler’s actions escalated the situation, and what behavior of the subject appeared earlier….

  2. Assessing K9 handler conduct leading up to a bite or attack:
    For example, did the handler provoke the subject (unlawful orders, aggressive posture)? Did the handler give the opportunity to comply? Was the dog released too early? Was there a chase? Under the total‐circumstances standard, these prior actions matter, not just the moment of attack.

  3. Qualified immunity arguments:

    Many use‐of‐force claims in K9 cases rely on qualified immunity for the officer. Before Barnes, an officer might successfully claim immunity by showing that there was some threat at the moment the dog attacked and saying, “That’s all the court needs to look at.” Post-Barnes, plaintiffs may argue that the officer’s actions leading up to that moment (e.g., if the handler unnecessarily escalated or created a dangerous scenario) reduce the reasonableness of using a dog bite, or the ability to claim immunity. The opinions in Barnes emphasize that context also matters for qualified immunity.  

  4. More nuanced use of “severity of crime,” “resistance,” “evading,” etc:
    Courts analyzing K9 cases will be expected to weigh more carefully how severe the alleged wrongdoing was (was it just a misdemeanor? suspect fleeing? armed?), whether the suspect was resisting or fleeing, whether force could have been avoided or reduced, and whether earlier de‐escalation was feasible—but these factors must be evaluated in light of the whole interaction. Barnes requires that these are not just looked at in isolation at the moment of bite.  

  5. Potential limits on “officer-created danger” arguments:
    Although Barnes did not resolve how officer‐created jeopardy (I.e., when officer conduct contributes to the risk) should be used in the reasonableness analysis, it leaves the door open. In K9 cases, plaintiffs may assert that the handler’s or agency’s training/policy/behavior created conditions that made a dangerous situation more likely. Courts will likely consider those as part of the totality of the circumstances.  

  6. Policy/training implications:
    Police departments (especially those with K9 units) may need to adjust their policies to account for the fact that courts will now more readily examine earlier events. For example, clarity in when a dog is released, when the handler gives warnings, how the pursuit is handled, etc., - to reduce claims that prior events made the use of force unreasonable. Departments might also need more documentation of what occurred prior, even about subject behavior, warnings, etc.

What the decision doesn’t yet clarify (especially in K9 contexts)

  • As noted above, Barnes didn’t decide exactly how to treat “officer‐created jeopardy.” In K9 cases, the question of whether a handler who created or worsened the danger (through their own actions) is more liable or less immune is not yet settled by the Supreme Court. Courts will need to refine that.  

  • The scope of what counts as “deadly force” vs. “non‐deadly force” with K9s in particular might raise new questions—does a K9 bite count as deadly force, or only if it is life‐threatening? The standard may vary, but Barnes’ framework applies regardless: all force uses must be objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

  • Because every case is fact-heavy, the outcome will still depend heavily on the details, such as the subject’s behavior, threat level, and whether warnings were feasible etc..

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K9 and the 3rd Prong: Fleeing or Actively Resisting Arrest