Unruh v. City of Wichita, Kansas (2024) - K9 Use of Force Case Review
Facts
On a rainy night, Unruh led Wichita police on a pursuit through city streets.
His vehicle spun out, jumped a curb, and ended up on a sidewalk.
Unruh exited the vehicle, holding a bag (later determined to contain methamphetamine), and dropped to the ground.
He did not comply fully with commands to show his hands and was seen reaching toward or under the car, which officers interpreted as possible weapon retrieval.
The officers subdued him using force: one officer’s police dog engaged, and officers allegedly kicked or struck him while restraining him.
Unruh filed suit nearly 23 months later, alleging that the force used was excessive and that the officers had been negligent.
Legal Issues
Whether Unruh’s claim should be characterized as civil battery (an intentional tort) or negligence (an unintentional tort).
If it is a battery, whether Unruh’s suit was time-barred under Kansas’s one-year statute of limitations for battery (K.S.A. 60-514(b)).
Whether a negligence claim for excessive force is viable under Kansas law, particularly whether an officer owes a legally recognized duty of care independent of the force itself.
Whether prior Kansas doctrine (in particular, language in Dauffenbach v. City of Wichita) incorrectly suggested that any “affirmative act” by an officer causing injury imposes a special duty, and whether that should be overruled or limited.
Holding & Reasoning
The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ rulings that Unruh’s claim was properly characterized as a civil battery, not negligence, and thus was barred by the one-year limitations period.
The Court emphasized that battery and negligence are distinct torts with different legal elements.
Battery requires an intentional unprivileged touching or striking (or apprehension thereof) that is harmful or offensive.
Negligence requires a duty, breach, causation, and damages, not intent.
The Court ruled that Unruh had not shown a separate duty owed by the police to him apart from the force used, so his allegations could not properly form the basis of a negligence claim.
In doing so, the Court disapproved that portion of Dauffenbach, suggesting that any “affirmative act” by an officer causing injury automatically gives rise to a special duty.
Because Unruh’s claim was battery in substance, the one-year statute under K.S.A. 60-514(b) applied, and his filing 23 months later was too late.
Significance & Takeaways
The decision reinforces that courts must look to the substance over form of a plaintiff’s claims: merely labeling a claim “negligence” does not control which statute of limitations or which tort elements apply.
In Kansas, challenges to police use of force must clearly identify a duty independent of the force itself for a tort theory of negligence to survive—this is a high bar under the ruling.
The Court settles that language in Dauffenbach, inviting broad liability for “affirmative acts,” is too expansive and is disapproved in that respect.
For plaintiffs alleging excessive force by police in Kansas, the ruling serves as a caution: unless one can frame the claim as something other than battery (I.e., invoke a duty beyond mere force), the shorter limitations period may apply and bar relief.
The decision contributes to the broader jurisprudence on how courts distinguish intentional torts from negligence in the context of law enforcement use-of-force claims.
